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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on two types of licenses that can best be
described as outliers—FRAND and compulsory licenses.
Overall, these two specific forms of licenses share the objective
of producing a fair and reasonable license of a technology
protected by intellectual property. The comparable objective
notwithstanding, each type of license achieves this end using
different mechanisms. The FRAND license emphasizes providing
the licensee with reasonable terms, e.g., by preventing a
standard patent holder from extracting unreasonably high
royalty rates. By contrast, compulsory licenses emphasize the
public benefit that flows from enabling access to an otherwise
inaccessible invention. Ultimately, both forms of license attempt
to create a value for the licensed product that can be remarkably
different from the product’s true market value. Nevertheless,
both forms ultimately benefit the end-consumer who pays less to
access a product subject to either of these forms of license. In
comparing these two forms of licenses, the paper hopes to
determine whether one form is better than the other, and if so,
from whose perspective—the consumer, the licensor or the
licensee. In doing so, this paper compares the different
prevailing efforts to embrace such licenses as well as the impact
of such licenses on the industry.

INTRODUCTION
Licenses are specific forms of contract structured as legal tools
detailing the terms of a bargain to either gain or give away rights in
exchange for other interests or obligations. Licenses are used in different
situations and for using different technologies to create and define rights
of the involved parties. Typically, a license agreement is a by-product of
a bargain or negotiation between the parties. Contemporary licenses,
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which are also structured as permits, determine specified activities or
create rights that would otherwise not be possible for the licensee.
Corporations use licenses as a mechanism to standardize terms and
conditions between vendors, consumers, competitors and other interested
parties. Thus, the objective of any license is to memorialize the terms
between parties—a fair license merely reflects the equal bargaining
power of the parties.
This paper specifically focuses on two types of licenses that can
best be described as outliers—FRAND and compulsory licenses. The
term FRAND is an acronym for “Fair, Reasonable and NonDiscriminatory,” which, in essence, signifies such features’ presence in
the license. The distinguishing feature of a FRAND license is that it is a
voluntary commitment by the licensor to negotiate “fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory” terms.1 On the other hand, compulsory licenses, as
“involuntary contract[s] between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller
imposed and enforced by the state,”2 force the licensor to enter into a
license arrangement. Thus, compulsory licenses can affect market
exclusivity (as new licensees enter the market) and thus, the market price
of the licensed product.3 Overall, these two specific forms of licenses are
outliers because both share the objective to produce a fair and reasonable
license of a technology protected by intellectual property. Despite the
comparable objective in FRAND and compulsory licenses, each type of
license achieves this end using different mechanisms. The FRAND
license emphasizes providing the licensee with reasonable terms, e.g., by
preventing a standard patent holder from extracting unreasonably high
royalty rates. By contrast, compulsory licenses emphasize the public
benefit that flows from enabling access to an otherwise inaccessible
invention. The term “fair and reasonable” takes on a slightly different
meaning, depending on the type of license involved. While a product’s
economic value is an important consideration for both license types, in
order to issue a compulsory license, the public’s need for the product and
failure to obtain a license under reasonable commercial terms remain
important considerations. Both forms of license attempt to create a value
1

See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).
See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349 (1993) (quoting PAUL K.
GORECKI, ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, REGULATING THE PRICE OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN CANADA: COMPULSORY LICENSING, PRODUCT
SELECTION, AND GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMMES (1981)).
3
See Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The
Supreme Court in Pharma v. Walsh and the Trips Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L.
REV. 777, 782 (2004).
2
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for the licensed product that can be remarkably different from the
product’s true market value. Nevertheless, both forms ultimately benefit
the end-consumer who pays less to access a product subject to either of
these forms of license.
This paper attempts to determine the advantages and
disadvantages of such end-based licenses. The objective of this exercise
is to determine whether one form is better than the other, and if so, from
whose perspective—the consumer, the licensor or the licensee. In doing
so, this paper compares the different prevailing efforts to embrace one
form or the other outside of the United States.
With the above background, Part I of this paper outlines what
FRAND licenses are, how they are deployed by the industry, and
discusses the prevailing issues concerning these licenses. Part II
highlights what compulsory licenses are and their role in securing access
to technology. Part III compares the two forms of licenses to determine
whether one form is superior to the other in their ability to achieving the
objectives of the system. The conclusion highlights a future course of
action to structure licenses that combine the best attributes of both forms
to achieve the objectives of the system, i.e., providing access to
technology and to the progress of science.

I. THE FRAND LICENSE
The FRAND licenses and the operational challenges they present
are best understood from the use of such licenses in the software
industry. In fact, the proliferation of software patents is an issue that has
been the subject of much debate recently.4 Information and
communications technology (ICT) patents can be best represented as a
myriad of overlapping “patent thickets.” An interested party must
navigate these patent thickets to commercialize the technology covered
by such patents.5 Indeed, Adam Jaffe defines it as "an overlapping set of
4

See generally Andrés Guadamuz González, The Software Patent Debate,
JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRAC., 1 (Jan. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/wipo_unido_smes_msk_07/wipo_uni
do_smes_msk_07_www_73624.pdf; Rosa Maria Ballardini, The Software
Patent Thicket: A Matter of Disclosure, 6:2 SCRIPTed 207, 221 (2009),
available at http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol6-2/ballardini.pdf;
Eugenia Georgiades, Falling Through the Cracks: The Problem of
Granting Software Patents, 7:3 SCRIPTed 474, 475 (2010), available at
http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-3/georgiades.pdf.
5
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119 (2000),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/25056143.
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patent rights” which causes interested licensees to obtain licenses on
several patents from multiple sources.6 Patent holders and potential
licensees have found them difficult to navigate for two reasons: the
prevalence of several patents, and the need for compatibility between
products. The need for compatibility is commonly called “product
interoperability,” which describes the ability of two or more products to
work with each other smoothly.7
Products involving the ICT technology are typically covered by
several patents that must allow the products to be interoperable to create
the desired outcome. Contemporary ICT products are generally covered
by multiple patents from various inventors working together on a
common platform. For example, in the mobile phone and cellular
network industry, the phones are not actually connected with one
another. Rather, cellular networks provide the connectivity by
transferring data between two (or more) handsets. For this purpose,
cellular networks must conform to established industry standards. One
such standard is the fourth generation long-term evolution (4G LTE)
network.8 Such established standards facilitate interoperability – or,
compatibility between products. Thus, interoperability is not merely a
user-friendly mechanism, but can also reduce costs because it is simpler
for phone companies to acquire technical and design information
pertaining to the networks when there is a standard in place.
Interoperability typically results in each technology being covered by
several patents – some, if not all, of which is essential to the further
development of the technology. In many cases these patents overlap
making it difficult for a single patent owner would find it difficult to
operate in a space delineated from other, often competing patents.
Sometimes, patents may read on each other’s products or processes,
thereby necessitating cross-licensing and resulting in both owners
competing in the same market. Realizing the interdependence of
competition and its importance to their businesses, patent owners whose
patents deal with standards that bear interoperable features can have such
patents designated as a standard. Specifically, patent owners may submit
6

Id.
See URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, BREAKING DOWN DIGITAL BARRIERS:
WHEN AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY DRIVES INNOVATION 4
(2007),
available
at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interopbreaking-barriers.pdf (defining information and communications technologies
interoperability as “the ability to transfer and render useful data and other useful
information across systems . . . applications, or components”).
8
See generally Stephan Dorn, Who Owns LTE Patents?, IPEG,
http://www.ipeg.com/who-owns-lte-patents/ (last visited June 4, 2015).
7
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such a patent to a standards-setting organizations (“SSO”),9 which can
elevate its designation to that of a standards-essential patent (“SEP”),
subject to the patent meeting the qualifying requirements. Further, at the
time of submission of the patent, the SSOs require the patent owner to
agree to standard declarations or commitments.10 As part of the
commitments, the patent owner makes the patent available for licensing
on FRAND terms if it is elevated as a standard.
The following part discusses the process of FRAND licensing
with particular emphasis on issues that affect the patent owners and the
industry from the SEPs. This discussion begins with an introduction to
SSOs, outlines the issues they face with the FRAND licenses, and ends
with a discussion of the available remedies while specifically
highlighting the unresolved issues therefrom.

A. Introduction to SSOs
SSOs are industry groups that set common standards in
significant areas of invention to facilitate mediation between intellectual
property (“IP”) owners and users.11 A standard is a set of technical
specifications providing for a common design for a product or process.12
As such, the SSOs are essentially membership organizations to which
leaders of that particular industry belong. For instance, the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the world’s largest
international standard development organization.13 Other independent
standard setting organizations like the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineering (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) publish standards and aim to foster “technological innovation and
excellence for the benefit of humanity.”14

9

These are also known as standards-developing organizations (“SDOs”).
David Long, Federal Circuit Gives Guidance on Litigating RAND
Royalty (Ericsson v. D-Link), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2014/12/federal-circuit-gives-guidance-onlitigating-rand-obligation-ericsson-v-d-link/.
11
See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights & Standards-Setting
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2002).
12
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8 (2008).
13
About ISO, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited June 4,
2015).
14
IEEE’s Mission & Vision, IEEE, http://www.ieee.org/about/vision_
mission.html (last visited June 4, 2015); Mission Statement, IETF,
http://www.ietf.org/about/mission.html (last visited June 4, 2015).
10
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Standards tend to harmonize various operational aspects of the
industry, and thus create a broad, uniform platform to interact
effectively. For example, when an industry in Timbuktu is certified by
the ISO for accounting practices, it signifies conformance to certain
practices that are the norm to the accounting industry in the rest of the
world. In a globalized world, standards evolve into a language distinct to
a particular industry and set a minimum bar. Thus, for industries located
in different parts of the world, conformity to standards can be status
defining, and thus help to create business opportunities.
When SSOs set standards, they take the form of a set of technical
specifications that provide, or attempt to provide, a common design for a
product or process in a given sector.15 If a standard cannot be
implemented without infringing on a particular patent, then that patent is
said to be standards-essential.16 When the SSOs declare a standard,
companies owning patents covering the standard should declare the
patent, especially if they have participated in the standards setting
process.17 Where the patent covers an essential aspect of that standard,
the patent owner may enter into negotiations with the SSO to adopt the
patent as a SEP. If it is designated a SEP, the patent owner can license it
for free or for a reasonable royalty rate to implementers of the standard.
Otherwise, the owner could refuse to license its SEPs forcing the SSO to
design its standards around the patents.
Generally, it is in the patent owners’ best interest to have their
patents adopted as a standard. The reasons are explained in-depth later in
this article. In short, this is because an SSO’s licensing terms greatly
increase the market power of a standards-essential patent, which is
appealing to patent owners in the standards-setting environment.
Notably, outside the SSO framework, many of these standards essential
15

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PATENT CHALLENGES
FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 31–50 (2013).
16
See JANICE M. MUELLER, POTENTIAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY BASED ON A
PATENT OWNER’S MANIPULATION OF INDUSTRY STANDARDS SETTING
36 (2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/atexemc/pdf/liability.pdf.
17
See Andrew Updegrove, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About
FRAND (But Didn’t Know Who to Ask), CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (Feb. 21, 2012),
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=2012022107482
6486 (“Standards setting organizations (SSOs) require those that help create a
standard (and sometimes all of the members of the SSO) to state before a
standard is approved for implementation whether they have any patent claims
that would be unavoidably infringed by someone implementing the standard . . .
.”).
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patents will likely compete with one another. The SSO framework
minimizes issues related to delay on product manufacturing that result
from competition between patent owners.18 The SSO framework is also
meant to function to minimize patent hold-up, a situation where the
patent owner can delay the product development by demanding
unreasonable or discriminatory royalties after a patent becomes a widely
adopted standard. 19 The alternative for the patent owner failing to
negotiate an agreement with the SSO, is to enter into licensing
agreements with interested licensees individually or not to license the
patent at all.
In negotiations that involve adopting a patent as an SEP, the
rules of the SSO define the licensing terms. SSOs can sometimes require
licensing assurances, or a disclaimer specifying that claims of an SEP
will not be enforced against members.20 The SSO policies generally
specify that SEPs must be licensed on “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory,” or FRAND terms.21 For example, the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is a SSO for the
telecommunications industry in Europe.22 The ETSI has an outlined
procedure for adopting patents as standards. Where a patent owner
believes itself to hold essential patents with regards to an ETSI standard,
e.g. the 4G and 4G LTE cellular networks, the ETSI provides a licensing
18

See Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the
Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON.,
1, 2-3 (Mar. 2013), available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar-13Special.pdf (explaining that SSOs could
set up policies that would limit hold-up more effectively).
19
Andy Updegrove, FTC Seeks Input on Patent Holdup in
Standards Development, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (May 16, 2011), http://www.
consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=20110514112823379.
20
Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP, What Does Reasonable and
Non-Discriminatory Mean, Anyway?, LEXOLOGY (May 22, 2013), http://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bf462132-5ec3-4b41-a7ab-52e27236a8ab.
21
See generally European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI
DIRECTIVES 36 (2013), available at http://portal.etsi.org/directives/home.asp;
see also ETSI Rules of Procedure, Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Policy,
2014 at 6.1 (“When an essential IPR relating to a particular standard or technical
specification is brought to the attention of the ETSI, the Director-General of
ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give within three months an
irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable
licenses on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and
conditions under such IPR . . . .”). Generally, an entity that joins an SSO does so
voluntarily; however, it is (usually) obligatory that the joining entity agree to
license their patents on FRAND terms. See id.
22
About ETSI, ETSI, http://www.etsi.org/about (last visited June 20, 2015).
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declaration form to be completed by the patent owner.23 The declaration
form includes a general undertaking that the patent owner will license its
patents under FRAND terms and conditions, so long as these patents are,
or become, essential to a new or existing ETSI standard. Once the patent
owner completes the licensing formalities, the patents become standardsessential subject to other qualifying requirements. Consequently, the
owner may either become an institute member or simply a third party
affiliated to the ETSI, each entailing certain rights under the ETSI
Policy.24

B. The Mechanism of FRAND Licensing
Essentially, the FRAND licensing mechanism enables users of
an SEP to negotiate and pay a royalty to a patent owner who has already
undertaken to be reasonable and fair to the SSO when the patent was
designated an SEP 25 At its core, FRAND licensing should offer the same
or similar terms to all users or licensees (sometimes called “developers”)
on a given patent. This is meant to minimize or prevent licensing abuses
and post-standardization hold-ups by the patent owner, such as refusing
to license the patent or setting exorbitant royalty rates.26
Notably, while the general requirement is to be fair and
reasonable, these terms are left undefined. Hence, one of the most
difficult issues that pervades this area relates to the definitions of the

23

See ETSI Rules of Procedure, supra note 21, at 6bis (“MEMBERS shall use
one of the ETSI IPR Licensing Declaration Forms . . . to make their IPR
licensing declarations.”); see also Internet Engineering Task Force, The Internet
Standards Process I, 10.3.2(C) (1996), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt
(noting that “[w]here the IESG knows of rights, … the IETF Executive Director
shall attempt to obtain from the claimant of such rights, a written assurance that
upon approval by the IESG of the relevant Internet standards track
specification(s), any party will be able to obtain the right to implement, use and
distribute the technology or works when implementing, using or distributing
technology based upon the specific specification(s) under openly specified,
reasonable, nondiscriminatoryterms”).
24
See Updegrove, supra note 17.
25
See generally Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of
Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 624 (2002).
26
See
Jonathan
Radcliffe
&
Gillian
Sproul,
FRAND
and
the Smartphone Wars, INTELL. PROP. MAG., 45–46 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/Files/Publication/477a076f-dd7e-408c-832164edf33c190e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5b202a76-bc80-4467-b2867a3b8e90e06d/Frand_Smartphone_Sproul.pdf (discussing how FRAND licenses
impact competition in the smart-phone market).
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FRAND terms.27 Generally, the term “fair” relates to the underlying
licensing terms, and describes them as not being anti-competitive, and
not unlawful.28 Similarly, the term “reasonable” relates to licensing rates
that do not result in unreasonable aggregate rates.29 A negotiations for
reasonable royalty rate, for instance, tends to be based on several factors
most of which would be hypothetical at the point of negotiation and it
ought to reflect consideration to factors such as the presence of patents
held by others, competition (ex ante), technological alternatives, ability
of the industry to evolve newer alternatives, the need and ability of the
technology to cater to product interoperability requirements and such.30
Thus, reasonableness is computed based on several factors
including the value of the patent pre and post standardization.
Nevertheless, negotiating a reasonable royalty rate will not only help the
licensee but should also address to mitigate serious industry problems
like royalty-stacking, which happens when a product potentially
involves or infringes many patents, and hence, bears multiple royalty

27

Id. at 45; see also Kesan & Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 239 (2014) (“One of
the most pervasive issues in the SSO context is that FRAND is rarely if ever
defined in advance of a conflict.”); Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin,
Taking Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Voluntary Commitment to
License Essential Patens on “Fair and Reasonable” Terms, SOC.
SCI. RES. NETWORK, Mar. 12, 2010, available at http://www.cravath.com
/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3233990_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2014).
28
See, e.g., Saumya Srivastava, Standard Essential Patents and Competition
Law, COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA, 15–16 (2013) (noting that “fair”
terms refrain from “bundling” (whereby buyers purchase several products as one
combined product on more advantageous terms), from providing free grant
backs (by which the licensor can incorporate the improvements of the licensee’s
R&D in its own products free of charge), and from granting mandatory
exclusivity agreements (which outline the grounds for the exclusion of an entity
from practicing the IP or patent rights of a given product, or from practicing the
standard of an SSO)).
29
See Radcliffe & Sproul, supra note 26, at 46 (asserting that reasonable royalty
would be close to the sum that parties would have reached in a hypothetical
arms-length negotiation); cf. Srivatsava, supra note 28 (explaining that
“reasonable” is a controversial matter when defining RAND terms due to the
difficulty in deciding whether effects from the technology’s wide use in light of
SSO adoption should be factored into its value).
30
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting
Reasonable Royalties for Standards-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1146–49 (2013), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/frand.pdf.
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burdens.31 The reference to “non-discriminatory” terms also relate to the
underlying licensing condition (rates and terms). This requirement is
meant to ensure that new entrants to the market are free to enter into
licensing relationship on the same basis as existing competitors, which
will help to maintain a level playing field in the industry. In other words,
a “non-discriminatory” clause should ensure that, a licensor’s rates and
terms must be the same for all licensees. In every case, it is the licensor’s
responsibility to ensure that every potential licensee receives the same
FRAND contract. Additionally patent owners generally tend to grant
users the rights to implement the standard of the SSO in their products
along with other patents declared “essential” or “necessary” by the
SSO.32
Importantly, patent owners who agree to make their patents SEPs
and make them available on FRAND terms enjoy several benefits. For
instance, they can influence the technological development of a
standard.33 Members of the SSO, particularly those who are also patent
owners, are positioned to influence not only the technical aspect of the
standards but also strategic aspects such as identifying areas where
standards will be created, the order of prioritization for standards
creation, and the ends or markets that these standards will serve. This
results in considerable authority over the development of the future
standards and become influential in the industry. 34 Other benefits from
FRAND licensing include certification and branding for standardscompliant products, which may further result in both shared costs and
early access to information regarding a related but evolving standard.35
By agreeing to license its SEPs on FRAND terms, however, the
patent owner forfeits certain rights. The patent owner cannot block
31

Id at 1149, 1150; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/stacking.pdf (discussing issues and
problems that arise in working reasonable royalties and highlighting the courts
responses to such problems).
32
See ETSI, supra note 23; John Cassels, UK: What is FRAND?, MONDAQ.COM
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/x/260184/Patent/What+Is+FRAND
(noting that when licensees are discriminated, there should be an objective
reason for doing so).
33
Andrew
Updegrove,
The
Essential
Guide
to
Standards,
CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/particip
ating1.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
34
See id (“Those that participate in the governing bodies of SSOs decide which
standards will be created, in what order, and to serve what purposes.”).
35
Id.
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implementation of a standard by licensing at exorbitant prices.36
Additionally, the owner cannot prevent noncompliant implementation of
the standard. They are, however, able to sue and seek an injunction in the
event of such implementation.37 Similarly, restricted disagreements over
the terms of the FRAND commitment cannot serve as an excuse for
patent owners to refuse to license or to disclose the patents.38 Any refusal
to license could be treated as a violation of the agreement with the SSO,
constituting a breach of the patent owner’s contract.39 And refusal by the
patent owner to adhere to the negotiated terms with licensees or to
disclose the patent will also be subject to contractual remedies.40
Ultimately, FRAND licenses are third party contracts involving
patent rights. Therefore, the patent owner’s refusal to license can cause
the potential licensee to sue the owner as a third party beneficiary
without affecting the SSO’s separate claim against the owner for a
breach of contract claim. The contract claim arises from the fact that a
patent holder voluntarily submits to the SSO’s licensing policy, which
typically include a commitment to license in FRAND terms, thus
creating an enforceable contract.41 Indeed, where the patent owner
accuses a third party of infringement, the accused can defend the
infringement suit on the grounds that the patent was not offered on fair
and reasonable terms. Similarly, the licensee -the implementer of the
standards – can offensively sue the patent owner because the agreement
does not conform to FRAND terms. These are very different situations.
36

See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing
the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. OF IT STANDARDS AND
STANDARIZATION RES. 1, 2 (2011) (explaining that under FRAND terms a
patent holder must not charge more than “the incremental value of his invention
over the next best technical alternative”).
37
See Jonathan Radcliffe & Gillian Sproul, FRAND and the smartphone wars,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAGAZINE, 47 (Dec. 2011/Jan. 2012) (explaining a
permanent injunction on noncompliant implementation may be granted after
succeeding at trial if there is “any sign of equivocation by the competitor that it
will not pay FRAND royalties”).
38
See Brooks, supra note 36, at 11 (“In agreeing to license on FRAND terms,
the IP owner has not agreed to constrain its licensing terms more tightly than the
‘range of reasonableness.’”).
39
See id. (explaining that in the event of disagreement over terms, the
implementer could “seek a determination through breach of contract action that
FRAND terms have not been offered”).
40
See id. (“[I]f an offer has been made and refused, then the only contractual
question to be adjudicated is whether the terms offered . . . fall outside the range
of reasonableness contemplated by the FRAND commitment.”).
41
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1991–96.
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As to the first scenario, the licensee’s position relative to the SSO
enables him to seek FRAND terms in the capacity of the intended
beneficiary of the patent owner and the SSO’s agreement with the SSO.42
As for the second, the patent licensee asserts a breach of contract on the
grounds that the patent was not offered on FRAND terms. Where the
licensee asserts a breach of FRAND terms, the prevailing reasoning is
that a FRAND licensee cannot “negotiate and sign a license, enjoy the
benefit of that license for as long as it pleases, and then collaterally
attack the license as unenforceable . . . on the theory that the license
terms violated the preceding contractual commitment.”43 Importantly, the
contractual nature of the FRAND commitment creates rights and
obligations that work with the rights and obligations associated with the
patent. As such, licensees are also bound by the FRAND agreement with
the same amount of care as the patent owner.
The FRAND agreements being enforceable contracts, suffer
from the same benefits and detriments as that of every other contract.44
The scope for potential disagreements and disputes from the contractual
terms increases. For instance, while the patent owner undertakes with the
SSO to negotiate reasonable royalties, questions such as what is
reasonable, or, who determines whether a term is reasonableness are all
subjective and hence, potentially contentious. The differences in
perceiving what a reasonable royalty is can lead to disputes and
disagreements that block the effective use of the technology. Thus, the
practical advice for potential licensees and patent owners is to thoroughly
investigate the SSO’s bylaws before the technology is licensed.45
However, in the event of a dispute, the confluence of contractual issues
with the associated IP rights does provide diverse remedies, as discussed
in detail later. Although it increases the parties’ options for remedies, it
simultaneously creates issues that may undermine the flow of the
arrangement’s intended benefits. The following section addresses some
42

See generally Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to
Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty-Stacking and
the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101 (2007).
43
See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing
the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. OF IT STANDARDS
AND STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 12 (2011), available at http://www.cravath.com
/files/uploads/documents/publications/3285864_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2014).
44
See id.
45
See Kraig A Jakobsen, Revisiting Standard-Setting Organizations’ Patent
Policies, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 43, 50 (2004), available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=102
7&context=njtip.
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of the remedies available when there is a dispute over a FRAND
commitment, with a view to highlight the various options and their
associated issues.

C. Available Remedies
The above discussion highlighted that a FRAND license
implicates patents licenses, the law of contracts, property laws and
reliance interest. The choice of remedies available and that can be
deployed in the event of a dispute over the FRAND agreements are best
determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the situation. The discussion of the various remedies
that have been used in FRAND disputes serves as a precursor to the
subsequent section, which will question whether some of these issues are
better dealt with by using compulsory licenses.
1. Injunctive Relieve Under the Patent Statute
The first form of remedy is for injunctive relief. A patent owner
believing his SEP to be infringed can seek injunctive relief under Title
35. 46 If a court denies the injunctive relief, it will cause the parties to
renegotiate the terms, as in every other contract. The factors considered
by a court in determining whether an injunction for the patent owner is
warranted are outlined in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.47 The U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously opined that an injunction should not be
automatically issued in every instance of alleged patent infringement.48
In essence, the party filing for injunctive relief should show its
entitlement to an injunction by providing evidence of four factors: (1) the
plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant warrants a remedy in equity; and (4)
public interest will not be disserved by a permanent injunction.49
In a standards-setting environment, especially considering the
pace of the technology’s development, issuance of an injunction can tilt
the balance towards the patent owner and create a hold-up problem.
46

35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952); see also JONES DAY, STANDARDS
ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, (2013), available at
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/77a53dff-786c-442d-8028906e1297060b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/270fc132-6369-4063-951b294ca647c5ed/Standards-Essential%20Patents.pdf.
47
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
48
See id. at 392–93 (“[T]his Court has consistently rejected invitations to
replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.”).
49
Id. at 391.
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Specifically, an injunction in favor of the owner prevents the use and
development of that technology and stalls further development over that
technology. This forces potential licensees to the negotiating table while
at the same time significantly increasing the bargaining power of the
patent owner.50 Even though an injunction theoretically maintains the
status quo in restraining one party from practicing another’s patent, when
an SEP patent is involved, the availability of a guaranteed injunctive
relief like in the pre-eBay era results in empowering patent-owners to use
the threat of injunction to demand more royalties. Considering the high
rate of product interoperability prevailing in the ICT sector, injunctions
effectively either force renegotiations or ensure due dispensation of
royalties.51 Basically, the guarantee of automatic injunctions for patent
infringement empowers the patent owner to stall a competitor by
strategically using the SEP. Thus, the biggest change with eBay is that by
taking away the guaranteed injunctive relief in the event of an alleged
infringement, it has made the field more equitable. Even the Federal
Circuit, traditionally patent friendly, has arguably shown a tendency to
be cautious when an SEP patent is involved.52 For instance, when
considering whether Apple would suffer irreparable harm absent an
injunction against Samsung’s Galaxy Nexus, the Court held that the
patentee must establish that the claimed feature is the cause of consumer
demand for the product being sold (“causal nexus”) in order to prove
irreparable harm from a finding of loss of sales/market share for the
product.53 That is, the court required that the causal nexus requirement
should establish that the patentee is indeed harmed by the infringement.54

50

See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and
the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (hereinafter, Chien &
Lemley) (discussing the effects of a threat of injunction).
51
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE and U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIALPATENTS SUBJECT TO
VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 4 (2013) [hereinafter POLICY
STATEMENT], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994
.pdf (explaining the patent-holdup problem).
52
See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1374–75 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); but see Ericsson, Inc., v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F. 3d. 1201, 1227
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (favoring patentee in ruling that there is no set Georgia Pacific
like factors for assessment of damages).
53
Apple, 695 F.3d at 1374–75.
54
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
see also Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(discussing the district court’s finding that Apple failed to show causal nexus
between harm and patent infringement).
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The eBay decision has important implications for SEP patents. In
essence, the patent owner’s agreement with the SSO presumptively
signifies the competitor’s need for the patent in exchange for a license on
FRAND terms, thus implying that a provision of royalty or monetary
damages would fit better than an injunction as an adequate remedy.55
Indeed, when Motorola sought an injunction to prevent Apple from using
its UMTS telecommunications capability on cell phones, Judge Posner
refused to issue an injunction on the grounds that Apple cannot be
enjoined from using the patent unless it refuses to pay a royalty on
FRAND terms.56 The district court noted that Apple had not, as Motorola
claimed, refused to pay for Motorola’s SEPs outright; Apple had only
refused to pay more than what Motorola would charge any other
potential licensee for its SEPs.57 The court reasoned that Motorola’s
commitment to license its patents to anyone willing to pay FRAND
royalties amounts to an acknowledgement that royalties would be an
adequate remedy.58 Further, the court opined that an injunction would
result in Motorola enjoying the benefits of the higher hold-up value
generated by withholding the technology from Apple.59 The court
specifically highlighted the harm that the resulting holding-up of SEP
patents would cause to consumers.60 Basically, the court determined that
SEP patent-owner plaintiffs cannot block potential licensees from using a
SEP patent and indirectly, inflate its value.61 Further, the court added that
a suit for declaratory relief in federal court should be entertained only if
either the party or its opponent could bring a federal suit for injunctive or
monetary relief.
On appeal, a divided majority of a three member panel of the
Federal Circuit agreed with Judge Posner and affirmed the denial of
injunctive relief on the grounds that money damages are adequate
compensation where an SEP patent is involved, but the court clarified

55

See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill.
2012) aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(refusing to enjoin infringement of the patent unless the infringer refuses to pay
royalties).
56
Id.
57
Geoff Duncan, Judge Dismisses Apple-Motorola Cases with Prejudice,
DIGITAL TRENDS, (June 24, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/judgedismisses-apple-motorola-cases-with-prejudice/.
58
Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 8, 9.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 16.
61
Id. at 17.
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that there was no per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs.62
Thus, for FRAND licenses, injunction is not an automatic option but a
remedy where the plaintiff can prove harm beyond failure of royalty
negotiation.
2. Breach of Contract
The second form of remedy is for a breach of the FRAND
contract. This form of remedy is most likely to be pursued by the
licensee rather than the patent owner when, on account of a dispute, the
licensee is unable to use the SEP. That is, licensees of the SEPs, as third
party beneficiaries, can sue the patent owner for the breach of FRAND
contract involving the SEPs in question. Similarly, licensees, acting as
“standard-users”—that is, a party using the SEPs in question in their
products already— can use breach of contract as a mechanism to sue the
patent owner and seek a remedy when they believe that the patent owner
has breached the FRAND obligations. Such breach of contract suits may
ensue even with potential licensees who are members of the SSO stand to
lose when patent owners seemingly do not abide by their FRAND
commitments. For instance, in 2010, Motorola sent an offer to Microsoft
outlining its willingness to license its patents that concerned the IEEE
WiFi 802.11 (The Wifi or WLAN), which is the wireless networking
SEP and ITU H.264, the video coding SEPs at a rate of 2.25% of the
end-product price.63 The offer from Motorola prompted Microsoft, in
November 2010, to file a complaint against Motorola alleging a breach
of contract and seek a declaratory judgment on the grounds that Motorola
failed to meet the FRAND commitments set by the IEEE on account of
having sought an unreasonable royalty rate for such SEPs.64 Microsoft
asserted that Motorola’s terms violated its FRAND undertaking with the
SSOs because the expected royalties were unreasonable.65 Microsoft

62

See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he legal principles for an injunction . . . supply no per se rule either
favoring or proscribing injunctions for patents in any setting, let alone the
heightened complexity of standardized technology.”).
63
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Microsoft v. Motorola, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089,
1098 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No. C10-1823JLR,
2012 WL 1669676, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2012); Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing issues arising from
the discussed license).
64
Microsoft Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
65
Id.
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asserted these grounds as a third party beneficiary.66 The complaint from
Microsoft caused Motorola to file a suit against Microsoft alleging patent
infringement.67
In March 2013, Judge Robart of the District Court for the
Western District of Washington dismissed Motorola’s claim for an
injunction and ruled that Motorola’s FRAND commitments created an
enforceable contract, and Microsoft, being a third-party beneficiary, had
the right to sue for a breach of that contract.68 After refusing to issue an
injunction, Judge Robart reset the royalty rates Motorola was charging
for their SEPs, rather than force Motorola to settle on a new FRAND
agreement.69 The new rates, issued by Judge Robart in April 2013,
remain one of the first examples of a calculation of FRAND royalty rates
for a SEP by the court, and will provide guidance for other SEP holders
and their potential licensees when it comes to negotiating FRAND rates
and terms.
The court’s decision is distinctive in that it left the FRAND
commitments unaltered while tailoring the payable royalty rates. In
arriving at an acceptable rate of royalty, the court used the factors
enunciated in the Georgia Pacific decision which enumerates a nonexhaustive list of fifteen factors in the context of assessment of damages
for patent infringement.70 Such factors include the royalty already
received by the patentee, the rates that the licensee paid for other patents,
the nature and scope of the license, the parties’ commercial relationship,
the duration, the term of the patent, the advantage of using the patent, the
profit proportion from the use of the patent, etc.71

66

See id. (Microsoft asserted that it was a third party on the basis of its contract
with the standard setting organization); see also Microsoft Corp v. Motorola
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *2 (discussing lower court’s
decision holding that Microsoft could sue as third party beneficiary).
67
On November 9, 2010, Motorola initiated an action in the Western District of
Wisconsin, which was subsequently transferred, wherein Motorola alleged that
Microsoft infringed Motorola-owned U.S. Patent Nos. 7,310,374; 7,310,375;
and 7,310,376. See Microsoft Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
68
Id.
69
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (W.D.
Wash. 2012) (denying summary judgment for both parties); see also Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *101 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (resetting royalty rates).
70
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v US. U.S. Plywood Corp, 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
71
Id. at 1120; see also Florian Mueller, A Closer Look at the 207-Page,
Landmark FRAND Rate-Setting Decision in Microsoft v. Motorola, FOSS
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Using these factors, Judge Robart’s court determined the amount
Microsoft would pay for all SEPs, and then proceeded by comparing this
amount to the portion of it attributable to Motorola’s patents.72 In this
analysis, Judge Robart confronted the possibility of royalty stacking
which happens when there are several SEPs owners in play.73 Hence,
Judge Robart determined the royalty rate and range with reference to
comparable licenses concerning pooled patents in a single package. The
new FRAND rates that were set by the court for Motorola’s SEPs were
notably lower than the royalty rates initially offered to Microsoft.
Motorola originally offered to license the SEPs to Microsoft at a rate of
2.25% of the end-product price, which translated into a range that fell
between $3.00 and $5.13 per unit.74 Judge Robart’s calculations set a
FRAND range between 0.555 and 16.389 cents per unit for video coding
SEPs, and a range of 0.8 to 19.5 cents per unit for wireless networking
SEPs.75
After the district court’s judgment, Microsoft sought a summary
judgment on the grounds that Motorola breached the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing, which is part of the RAND commitment.76 In
response, the court pointed out that when a patentee’s interest in merely
seeks injunctive relief per se does not as “[a] matter of law violate[] the
duty of good faith.77 “Whether seeking injunctive relief for a SEP
frustrates the purpose of the contract is based on the specific
circumstances of the case, and here [licensee] has failed to carry its
burden on summary judgment to demonstrate that a specific action by [ ]
PATENTS (April 28, 2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/a-closer-lookat-207-page-landmark.html (discussing the impact of Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola).
72
See Microsoft Corp., No. C10-1823 JLR , 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash,
Apr. 25, 2013), at *95.
73
Id. at *72. The concept of royalty stacking occurs when a single product
infringes on many patents or requires licenses from multiple patent holders.
Such “royalty stacking” can result in a hold-up on the patent and prevent the
patent from being manufactured and sold.
74
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (W.D.
Wash. 2012); see also David Long, Ninth Circuit affirms Judge Robart’s RAND
decision (Microsoft v. Motorola), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (July 31, 2015),
available at http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2015/07/ninth-circuit-affirmsjudge-robarts-rand-decision-microsoft-v-motorola/ (July 31, 2015).
75
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217,
at p. 207 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (resetting royalty rates).
76
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (W.D. Wash.
2013).
77
Id. at 1187.
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in seeking injunctive relief violated its duty of good faith.”78 When the
motion was denied, the case proceeded to the jury. 79 Later, a federal jury
in Seattle ruled that Motorola owed Microsoft $14.5 million in damages
for breaching its FRAND obligation on the SEPs in question.80
Meanwhile, the Georgia-Pacific factors have been cited in other
cases as an important guide-post, when duly modified, to calculate
FRAND royalty rates.81 The final word on the use of these factors for
SEP patents has come from the Federal Circuit as part of its decision in
Ericsson v. D-Link, wherein Ericsson accused D-Link, in 2010, of
infringing a set of its 802.11 SEPs which were essential for the Wi-Fi
standard.82 At the outset the court held that there is no Georgia-Pacificlike list of factors that district courts can “parrot” for every case
involving RAND-encumbered patents.83 Instead, the court held that
district courts must carefully ensure to instruct the jury only on factors
that are relevant to the specific case at issue. 84 Thus, jury instructions
from the district court to consider damages for RAND commitments
should be specifically tied to the RAND commitment that is at issue.
Further, courts must be cautious not to instruct the jury on factors that
are irrelevant to the question presented at trial.85 Further, the appellate
court held that it is the duty of district courts to clarify to the jury that
any royalty award must be based on the incremental value of the
invention and it cannot be based on the value of the standard as a whole
or any increased value the patented feature gains from its inclusion in the
standard.86 The court also concluded that, if an accused infringer wants
an instruction on patent hold-up and royalty stacking, it must provide
adequate evidence to that effect in relation to both the RAND
78

Id. (internal citations omitted).
See, e.g., Microsoft v. Motorola, Inc., ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG,
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/lawsuit/microsoft-v-motorola-inc-2/
(last
visited June 4, 2015).
80
Steven Musil, Microsoft Awarded $14.5M in Motorola Patent Licensing Suit,
CNET (Sept. 4, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/microsoft-awarded14-5m-in-motorola-patent-licensing-suit/.
81
See e.g., Ericsson Inc., v. D-Link Systems, 773 F. 3d. 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Varian
Medical Sys., 561 Fed. App’x. 934, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Whiteserve, LLC v.
Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 27-29 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
82
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(discussing the Georgia-Pacific factors).
83
Id. at 1230.
84
Id. at 1231.
85
Id.at 1226 (emphasis omitted).
86
Id.
79
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commitment at issue as well as the specific technology referenced
therein.87 This decision is in line with the Federal Circuit’s general
hesitancy to adopt per se rules for RAND commitments reflected earlier
in the Apple v. Motorola ruling discussed in the following pages.88 In
avoiding a per se rule, the decision tends to favor the patentee89 and will
become a guidepost for SEP holders and possible licensees to use when
negotiating licensing and royalty rates on FRAND terms.90
These cases demonstrate that royalty rates can be (re)set through
judicial intervention rather than forcing a renegotiation of FRAND
terms.91 Further, they also demonstrate the successful use of a breach of
contract claim by interested licensees when a FRAND agreement is
involved.92
3. Award of Money Damages
The restitutionary remedy for a breach of a FRAND contract is
the awarding of monetary damages with a view to ensure that the party in
breach returns whatever he received from the non-breaching party.93 This
remedy has its roots as a breach of contract claim and in the FRAND
context its operation is unlike an injunction which can force parties to renegotiate.94 Without meaning to comment on the parameters used to
calculate the damages, it is suffice to state that monetary damages are
meant as restore the benefit of the breach to the plaintiff. Basically, when
the presence of an injury has been established, courts award monetary
87

Id.
See generally Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
89
Long, supra note 10.
90
See, e.g., Daniel A. DeVito et al., US District Court Issues First Decision
Calculating a FRAND Royalty for Standards-Essential Patents, SKADDEN (Apr.
29,
2013),
http://www.skadden.com/insights/us-district-court-issues-firstdecision-calculating-frand-royalty-standard-essential-patent (discussing the
impact of Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc.).
91
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *101 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (resetting royalty rates).
92
See, e.g., CLAUDE M. STERN, IMPACT OF MICROSOFT V. MOTOROLA
ON
FRAND
LICENSING
IN
THE
US,
(2013),
available
at
http://doritkorine.livecity.me/image/users/256043/ftp/my_files/Presentations/cla
ude%20Stern_pdf.pdf?id=13904618 (discussing the impact of Microsoft v.
Motorola as well as the use of breach of contract claim).
93
See Richard A. Epsteini & David J. Kappos, Legal Remedies For Patent
Infringement: From General Principles To FRAND Obligations For Standard
Essential Patents, 9(2) COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, 68 at 71 (2013).
94
See id. at 72 (highlighting that injunctions, when combined with damages, can
overstate the extent of plaintiff’s losses and discussing the competing interest
that are considered to determine the type of damages when there is a breach).
88
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damages to the injured party as a matter of restitution.95 For instance, 35
U.S.C. § 284 provides that “upon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court.”96
The mechanism of calculation of damages notwithstanding, the
question with respect to monetary damages is whether harm to the patent
owner has to be specifically proved.97 In other words, the issue is
whether a patentee can be entitled to monetary relief or royalty—which
is much more than nominal damages—if the patentee is able to prove
infringement but unable to prove harm.98 For instance, Motorola, as part
of its dispute with Apple, filed a complaint with the International Trade
Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Apple of six
Motorola SEPs.99 Motorola petitioned to the ITC to prevent Apple from
importing infringing products into the United States.100 In response,
Apple filed a counterclaim and sued Motorola for failing to offer its
SEPs on FRAND terms, and additionally claimed that Motorola
infringed some of Apple’s patents.101 That is, Apple claimed that
Motorola’s Android phones are copies of the iPhone “as a whole.”102
Judge Posner, sitting by designation on the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois,103 determined that neither party was able to
show incurrence of damages or of infringement.104 The court noted that
“Motorola’s desire to sell products that compete with the iPhone is a
separate harm—and a perfectly legal one—from any harm caused by
patent infringement.”105 In essence, he asserted that Apple had failed to
95

See id. (discussing the issues relating to calculating damages in the FRAND
context).
96
35 U.S.C § 284 (2012).
97
See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).
98
Id.
99
See Motorola Mobility, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 553 Fed. Appx. 971(Fed.
Cir. 2014).
100
See id. at 972 (discussing the Commission’s decision to deny Motorola’s
petition).
101
Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d. at 920.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 904.
104
See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Why Judge Posner Pulled the
Pug on Apple v. Motorola, FORTUNE (June 23, 2012), http://tech.fortune.
cnn.com/2012/06/23/why-judge-posner-pulled-the-plug-on-apple-v-motorola/
(discussing Posner’s decision in Apple v. Motorola).
105
Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
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show incurrence of damages, as Motorola’s actions amounted to healthy
competition in the ICT market and was not a direct infringement of a
SEP owned by Apple. Similarly, Motorola was also unable to prove that
Apple violated its SEP patents. 106 Given this, the court noted that both
parties are seeking “substantial royalty predicated on no showing of
harm.”107 The court specifically “disp[elled] any impression that such
relief—substantial ‘compensatory’ damages for no tangible injury—
would be proper…”108 Conversely, the court held that monetary damages
would be a proper remedy when there is clear proof of infringement with
harm.109 On appeal the Federal Circuit, in a split panel, established that a
“fact finder may award no damages only when the record supports a zero
royalty award”110 and added that if the record does not include details of
either party’s royalty estimate, the district-court as the fact-finder has a
duty to consider what a reasonable royalty would be.111
4. The International Trade Commission as an Alternate Forum
Protecting the borders of a country against counterfeit goods is
not only an important aspect of national IP law but also of trade law.
Among other things, section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930112 prohibits
unfair competition from importation of foreign products that infringe
valid U.S. IP rights, including patents, into the United States.113 To
prevent importation of counterfeit goods and to adjudicate disputes
arising therefrom, the Tariff Act of 1930 establishes the International
Trade Commission (ITC).114 The ITC is an administrative body and a
quasi-judicial federal agency with the power to investigate complaints of
violations of section 337 of the Tariff Act. 115 This section bans the
importation of articles that infringe a valid United States patent,
copyright, trademark, mask work, or design.116 Similarly, nonmanufacturing sectors are also protected if they are engaged in licensing
106

Id.
Id. at 909.
108
Id.
109
See id. at 909–10 (stating that reasonable royalties may be awarded when
infringement is proved).
110
See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
111
Id. at 1328. See also SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926
F.2d 1161, 1167–68 (Fed.Cir.1991).
112
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
113
Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
114
See id. (giving the international trade commission the authority to investigate
violations of the Tariff Act).
115
Id.
116
Id. § 1337(a)(2).
107
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and research.117 Termed as a “domestic industry” requirement, the
provision protects intellectual property owners if the threat or effect of
importation of a product into the United States can destroy or
substantially injure a domestic industry, or, prevent the establishment of
an industry, or restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United
States.118 When the ITC determines that the importation affects or can
affect a domestic industry in the United States, it issues an exclusion
order.119
In the context of FRAND agreements, the patent owner has the
option of approaching the ITC to obtain an exclusionary order preventing
an alleged infringer from importing his product into the United States on
the grounds that “domestic industries” are affected by the importation.120
This order stands until resolution of any breach of contract claims or
patent infringement suits concerning the importation.121 The exclusionary
order creates the same effect as an injunction by pushing the alleged
infringer to negotiate with the patent owner. Further, it is important to
note that the status of the ITC as an administrative body frees it from the
bounds of judicial prescriptions like the tests outlined in the eBay
decision.122 This position has been upheld by the Federal Circuit in
Spansion, Inc. v. ITC.123 Consequently, it is relatively easy to get an
exclusionary order from the ITC—a process that Professors Chien and
Lemley assert is being extensively used by patent owners.124 The ITC,
however, may refuse to grant an exclusionary order by considering
consumer interest in the product at issue, as well as other public interest
117
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Gary M. Hanth, General Exclusion Orders Under Section 337, 25 NW. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 349, 361 (2005); see also VastFame Camera, Ltd. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 386 F.3d 1108, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion that the ITC
exclusion order cannot be subject to collateral attack).
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See Understanding Investigations Of Intellectual Property Infringement And
Other Unfair Practices In Import Trade (Section 337), USITC, available at
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us337.htm (“Section 337 investigations
require formal evidentiary hearings in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.). The hearings are held before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).”); see also Standards, FRAND, NPEs &
Injunctions Conference: Final Part, IPKAT (Nov. 7, 2013) available at
http://ipkitten.blogspot.in/2013/11/standards-frand-npes-injunctions_7.html.
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Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Chein & Lemley, supra note 50, at 3–4.
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factors.125 Nevertheless, Professors Chein and Lemley claim that “[T]he
ITC views enforcing patents as in the public interest, resulting in a thumb
on the scale in favor of the patentee in public interest analyses” ”126
In a recently released report, the Department of Justice along
with the United States Patent and Trademarks Office (“USPTO “) urges
the ITC to reconsider its use of exclusionary orders for SEPs whose
owners have agreed to abide by FRAND licensing requirements.127 After
all, a royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusionary order
would skew in favor of the patentee in a manner inapposite to the
patentee’s FRAND commitment.
5. Other Considerations Outside the U.S.
The European Union presents an interesting study of how they
deal with FRAND licensing and infringement issues. In May 2009, for
example, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany (BGH) oversaw a case
regarding CD-Rs.128 It held that an entity that infringes a patent only
because it cannot obtain a license from the patent owner may defend
itself by invoking the “abuse of dominant market position” defense.129 In
effect, the BGH allowed an alleged infringer to defend itself by arguing
that it is entitled a FRAND license under antitrust law.130
Similarly, a FRAND defense was considered by a Japanese court
in Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics.131 In Japan’s Tokyo District Court,
Samsung sued Apple for two cases of infringements on SEPs related to a
wireless data packet system. The Tokyo District Court rejected
Samsung’s claims on the grounds that Samsung had failed to comply
125

See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 51.
Chien & Lemley, supra note 50, at 20.
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BGHZ KZR 39/06 (May 6, 2009). See also Rob Harrison, The Orange Book:
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rest of EU as well. Article 82 of the European Commission Treaty deals with
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See, e.g., Anette Gartner & Thorsten Vormann, Federal Supreme Court Rules
in Orange Book Standard, INT’L LAW OFFICE (May 26, 2009) available at
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=abc44bef50b0-4b0b-8c70-a28d7fa5502a (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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Heisei 23 (WA) 27941 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 2012); see also Tokyo High
Court Publishes Apple v. Samsung Ruling, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Mar.
30, 2014) http://www.worldipreview.com/news/tokyo-high-court-publishesapple-v-samsung-ruling.
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with an agreement requiring it to license their SEPs on FRAND terms.
Before the suit, the two parties had been negotiating a licensing
agreement on a set of Samsung SEPs, and Samsung had offered a royalty
rate of 5%. Apple argued that this was unreasonable and took the matter
to court. When the court agreed with Apple, both parties renegotiated the
FRAND agreement.132
The interesting aspect of this decision is that the intellectual
property policy of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
ETSI was used as a guideline in holding that Samsung had abused its
market power, based on evidence of Samsung’s failure to fulfill its
FRAND obligations pertaining to the SEPs. Additionally, the court
acknowledged that Samsung, in maintaining its petition for a preliminary
injunction, was abusing the legal process by delaying the disclosure of
standards-essential patents to potential licensees. In the final ruling, the
Japanese court also found that Samsung’s SEPs were unenforceable, and
so Samsung could not claim monetary damages or injunctive relief.133

C. The FRAND State of Affairs
Currently, the diversity of remedies and the differences in the
outcome that the choice of remedy can result in remains a concern. Using
the court process to establish FRAND terms can cause a hold–up that
increases the cost of a license, resulting in reduced efficiency. The
alternative of raising a breach of contract claim is not necessarily a quick
solution either. In any event, FRAND commitments differ on a case-bycase basis, and hence, there are no standard terms or royalty rates for
these contracts. Further, what may be a reasonable royalty rate in one
case may be unreasonable in another. Given this, the target seems to be
to generate a workable royalty range. Such a FRAND range may be
applicable to any case regarding the same kind of device or standard.
Working within a set range makes remedies easier to calculate, and can
potentially lead to fewer disputes. In conclusion, although SSOs and
FRAND licensing have the potential to be positive forces, they currently
use up court time and result in muddied water for all parties involved,
more so as FRAND licenses implicate more than one area of law such as
patent infringement, antitrust and contractual issues. Further, as Judge
Posner’s decision in Apple v. Motorola suggests, the cumbersome nature
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of litigation in our patent system is exacerbated by the current lack of a
universal definition for the cost of patent infringement.134
And then there is compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing
bypasses the issues of FRAND licensing because the Government
establishes a rate. That rate becomes the standard for licensing that
invention. Although that rate may not be ideal, the benefit is that the rate
is clearly defined up front. Further, the upfront determination of rates
gives the parties information to take into consideration before
implementing the standard in their products. The primary issue with
compulsory licensing, however, arises when a patent owner that does not
want to license its patent is forced to license. With this as the
background, the next section discusses whether the compulsory license
can be a solution to the problem presented by the FRAND license.

II. AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPULSORY LICENSING
The monopoly component of any patent consists of the right to
prevent competition and to charge a maximum market price. As a
mechanism, compulsory licenses are meant to balance the patent owner’s
right with the societal need for the product, and operate where public
interest concerns outweigh the patent holders’ rights.135 Hence, such
licenses affect the patentee’s monopoly. However, these licenses also
represent a compromise between the complete revocation of patents on
the one hand, and patentee’s absolute property rights over the invention
on the other.136 Operationally, compulsory licenses can force an
unwilling patentee to license the patent during the term of the patent.137
They are therefore effectively involuntary contract[s] that are imposed by
the state to achieve larger public objectives.138 Such licenses affect
134
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market exclusivity and consequently, the market price.139 In theory, the
incentive for encouraging innovation, which forms the central tenet of
the patenting process, dictates that the price of a patented product cannot
be controlled by a third party, including the government, unless licensed
compulsorily.

A. The Effects of Compulsory Licensing
1. Access to consumers
The issuance of a compulsory license has important effects.
First, it ensures that consumers have access to the licensed products
before the end of the patent term and at a price that makes it more
accessible and less privileged. The issuance of a compulsory license
usually is a rare occurrence in almost all countries. Most common
instances of compulsory licensing are found in areas that are critical to
public interest like energy sectors and pharmaceutical patents. A
compulsory license involving a technology signifies an overwhelming
need of the public for that patent to address an important issue that
concerns the public. If there is a benefit from the compulsory license, it
is the increased access that these types of licenses create.
2. Effect on the rights of the patentee
Next, it is presumed that the impact of the compulsory license is
adversely felt by the patentee. Given this, compulsory licenses are
viewed as disincentives adversely affecting inventors and patent
holders.140 That is, patents serve as market incentives enabling patentees
LICENSING, PRODUCT SELECTION, AND GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT
PROGRAMMES (Economic Council of Canada 1981)).
139
See Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for
Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 402 n.260 (discussing the Department of
Health and Human Services Reimbursement Board’s establishment of price
limits at the lowest prices at which the drug is available).
140
See Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of
Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1291–92 (2001). For an example of
judicial treatment of compulsory licensing, see Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), in which the Court outlined the
traditional American posture on compulsory licensing. In considering whether
the rights of a patent owner included the right not to put his inventions to
manufacturing use, the Court recognized that exclusivity characterizes the
absoluteness of the inventor’s property rights. Id. at 424. The patent in question,
the Liddell patent, related to a paper bag machine. Id. at 406. After the patent
was issued in 1896, the owner neither manufactured nor licensed the patent. Id.
at 408. In 1908, the patent owner sued the defendant for infringement for
manufacturing the patent. Id. at 406. The defendant alleged that the owner of an
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to derive maximum economic efficiency from the market and this is
irrespective of maximization of consumer welfare. The market incentive
component is derived from the conception of patents as a private
property that is gained in return for certain conditions, one of which is
disclosure.141 That is, the inventor, among other things, reveals the
invention in return for the government’s promise of a specified statutory
monopoly on the production of the idea.142 Since competition is curtailed
during the monopoly period, patent owners charge the highest price that
the market can bear, typically far exceeding the marginal cost.143
Presumably, the increased cost covers the investor’s past and future
investments on research and development. Consumers, in turn, associate
the higher cost for patented products with the privilege of using the
invention.144 Hence developed nations, particularly the United States,
believe that patent owners with valuable products will market them and
discourage government interference with patent monopolies.145 In
essence, the compulsory license is presumed to adversely affect the
patentee in two ways. The first is the dismissal of the patentee’s right to
refuse to license the patent; and the second is the reduced economic
incentive for the patentee from the forced nature of these licenses.
3. Government use of compulsory licenses
While the general rule is that the patentees enjoy total monopoly
during the patent term, proponents of compulsory licenses assert that the
overall objective of the system is to serve the public, and that this is only
satisfied when these licenses are appropriately deployed.146
unused patent was limited in law from alleging infringement. Id. at 428.
See Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 666, 674–76, 680–81
(1998).
142
Id. at 681.
143
See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1065–66 (1997) (“[P]roducers will price at marginal
cost only if they are forced to by the existence of competition. A producer who
controls a market will cut output and raise prices, increasing its profits but
reducing both consumer and aggregate social welfare.”).
144
Id. at 996 (discussing the privilege issue).
145
See id; see also Fauver, supra note 142, at 677–78. Scholars have argued that
compulsory licenses are unconstitutional since the grant of the exclusive patent
right is unconditional. Id. at 678. Others have compared compulsory licenses to
government appropriation under the takings jurisdiction, implying that patent
rights cannot be restricted by compulsory licenses without just compensation. Id.
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Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U.
PA. L. REV. 378, 400 (1972); see also Fauver, supra note 142, at 681 (discussing
why the United States views compulsory licenses as unnecessary).
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Consequently, even countries like the United States that traditionally
shun compulsory licenses use the mechanism where appropriate to
achieve the overall goals of the system. Thus, provisions on compulsory
licenses are not alien to the United States. For example, 28 USC § 1498
empowers the United States government, or those authorized by it, to
make any use or manufacture of a patented product or process “without
license.” While the patent holder is entitled to “compensation,” he cannot
enjoin the government from using it.147 Similarly, the Bayh-Dole Act148
requires patent holders to use their invention for public benefit if the
underlying research was funded by federal agencies. Under this Act, the
federal government retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royaltyfree license to use the invention, and the federal agency that funded the
research retains a “march in” right to compel a license. This includes the
right to “alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably
satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees.”149 Similarly, the
Clean Air Act allows compulsorily licensing of a technology funded by
U.S. government grants in certain circumstances.150
Further, U.S. law also allows compulsory licenses for promoting
domestic economic objectives. For instance, the Energy Storage
Competitiveness Act allows the government to require licensing of
patents to “advance the capability of the United States to successfully
compete in global energy storage markets.”151 This arises when the
public’s need for the technology overweighs the need for the patentee’s
monopoly right. The fact that such provisions relate to several
technologies demonstrates that public interest issues can arise in different
situations concerning those technologies.
4. Economic incentive and compulsory licenses
As for the concern that compulsory licenses serves as a
disincentive, while the patentee loses the right to determine the price of
the product for the market, the assumption that it results in an economic
loss or even a real loss of revenue is a not always correct. Recent
147
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instances have demonstrated that the patentee can actually enjoy greater
profits from the increased sales following the licensing of the product.
For instance, when Bayer’s patent on Nexavir was subject to a
compulsory license in India, it resulted in much higher volume sales of
the drug in the country generating higher revenue and increased access.
152
The increased sales volume offset any revenue losses that Bayer
suffered from the license.153 Compulsory licensing the patent resulted in
a steady stream of revenue given the wider access that becomes possible
when these licenses are deployed.
Additionally, the effect of compulsory licensing on the concept
of incentivization is changing as property rights become more widely
acknowledged in several countries. That is, globalization has caused
newer markets to open for companies with critical technologies. This
market expansion increases the volume of sales of such technologies, and
may lead to sufficient profits for the companies despite the lower price
the compulsory license commands. As the sales for the patent increases,
it tends to compensate for the reduction in the sale price of each unit. In
all, despite the compulsory license, the presence of a bigger market can
preserve the patentee’s incentive component. Further, it can serve as a
way to provide needed technology to those markets that are otherwise
unable to access such technologies.

B. Examples of Historical and Contemporary Use of Compulsory
Licensing Outside the United States
Historically, compulsory licensing has been used by different
governments to address various national issues. The origin of
compulsory licensing precedents can be traced to the French law of 1791
which was later adopted by many European countries as a mechanism to
encourage local working of inventions.154 Similarly, the British
government appointed the Sir Edward Fry Committee in 1901 to analyze
the link between compulsory licensing and industrial production.155 In
1907, Mr. Lloyd George, President of the Board of Trade, successfully
introduced a bill incorporating compulsory licensing provisions in the
House of Commons by highlighting that foreigners owned 6500 out of
152
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14,700 patents issued in 1906 and worked them outside of England.156
Consequently, compulsory licensing provisions were introduced in the
British patents legislation.157
In contemporary times, India’s compulsory licensing provisions
have been the focus of attention. Under the Indian patent legislation, the
government could, in the public interest, interfere with patent rights and
compulsorily license the patent.158 Patented inventions that were either
not reasonably priced or were not worked to satisfy the reasonable
requirements of the public could be subject to compulsory licensing.159 In
turn, the reasonable requirements of the public were deemed unsatisfied
if the invention was not worked in India, if an existing or proposed trade
was prejudiced, if the demand for the product was not adequately met, or
if the local working of the invention was prejudiced due to
importation.160 Of these grounds, the local working requirement has been
the most contentious on the grounds that it discriminates against foreign
manufacturers, especially in the context of pharmaceuticals. The same
requirement has been present in Article 68 of Brazil’s patent law, under
which anti-competitive practices, failure to locally manufacture, and
intentionally failing to satisfy the demands of the market can all serve as
a basis for compulsory licensing. 161
Recently, India has been one of the few countries that have taken
the bold step of working the compulsory licensing provision to create
access to patented medication. In India, Cipla, a generic drug company
asserted that the reasonable needs of the Indian public were not being
satisfied because a certain patented drug, Sorenefib,162 was priced out of
access of the several thousand patients living in the country.163 Cipla, the
generic drug company, filed a petition to have Soranefib covered by a
compulsory license. When the Controller General of the Indian patent
156

Id. at 53.
Id.
158
Indian Patents Act, 1970 (as amended in 2005), 27 India A.I.R. Manual 450,
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office examined the petition, it was found that although India contained
approximately 20,000 patients with liver cancer and about 9,000 patients
with kidney cancer in the years 2008 to 2010, a negligible amount of
Sorafenib was imported into India for sale by Bayer. In fact, no
importation ensued in 2008 – a year when Bayer recorded a worldwide
profit of over $678 million dollars in the rest of the world.
To the Controller concluded that the patentee was not catering to
the demands of the market, which is an important statutory criterion to
avoid a compulsory license, and further, that the reasonable expectations
of the public was not being met. Further, the Controller concluded that
the drug was unreasonably priced at Rs. 2,000,000 ($ 5,000
approximately) per month in a country where the World Bank reported
that more than 25% of the population earned less than a dollar a day.
Consequently, the Controller granted the request for compulsory license.
On appeal, this license was sustained by the Intellectual Property
Appellate Board of India. Importantly, the appellate body raised the rate
of royalty that was originally set by the Controller.
One important feature of this license was that the government
negotiated the rate and access was made available immediately once the
appeal process was completed. Interestingly, the concern over economic
cost of litigation and the associated costs of the patent holder pursuing a
variety of remedies remains less with a compulsory license with
compared with the FRAND regime. Additionally, the ends of the system,
being access and the duty of the patentee to meet the societal expectation
in return for the benefitting from the monopoly rights are predominant
considerations in a compulsory licensing regime – a consideration that
the FRAND regime is now being accused of allegedly lacking.

C. Compulsory Licensing in International Agreements
Internationally, the Trade Related Intellectual Property
Agreement (TRIPS) incorporates the Paris Convention on Industrial
Property and expressly authorizes the use of compulsory licenses as a
limitation of the rights of the patent owner under certain terms and
conditions.164 TRIPS outlines the use of the compulsory licenses under
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Article 31.165 Most importantly, the compulsory licensing of a patent
shall be authorized by the government or third parties authorized by the
government. Further, each compulsory license shall be individually
authorized based on need for the country and by following proper
procedures.
One such procedure is for the government to attempt to negotiate
with the patent holder for licensing the patent on commercially
reasonable terms. The term commercial reasonableness is to be weighed
in the context of national need and not a reference to the highest
marketable price. Indeed, Article 31 (h) requires that the adequacy of the
remuneration be measured by taking into account the economic value of
the authorization. Similarly, the compulsory license will cease once the
need ceases to exist. The need for prior negotiations with a view to
compulsorily license (“prior negotiations”) can be dispensed with under
Article 31(b), “[i]n the case of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial
use.”166 Similarly, prior negotiations are waived where such licenses are
required to cure judicially determined anti-competitive practices under
Article 31(k).167
It is also worth noting that under the TRIPS Agreement such
licenses should be non-exclusive and should be non-assignable.
Essentially, this will allow the patent owner to continue to use the patent
and will also prevent governments from misusing the patent. Other
interesting aspects are that TRIPS pre-supposes that a compulsorily
licensed use of the patent will be made predominantly for the supply of
domestic market. Similarly, the agreement also subjects such licenses to
judicial and other appropriate review mechanism to provide relief to
aggrieved patentees. Other than these enumerated criteria, the TRIPS
agreement does not detail the reasons or the basis for issuing compulsory
licenses.

III. A COMPARISON BETWEEN COMPULSORY LICENSES AND
FRAND LICENSES
The following section compares the two types of licenses with a
view to determine whether some of the disadvantages of the FRAND
licenses can be remedied by the use of either the compulsory license or a
hybrid of both of these types of licenses.

165
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Of the two types of licenses, operationally compulsory licensing
is much more efficient once the government determines the need for the
license because the price negotiations cannot be contentious beyond a
point. That said, the larger question is whether the compulsory nature of
such licenses can work to discourage patent owners. The benefit is that
the mere presence of compulsory licensing options will and can ensure
that the patentee cannot use pricing or other strategies as a mechanism to
hoard the product and create artificial demand. This benefit is important
considering that FRAND licenses in the SEP context has remained
inefficient because patentees tend to deploy pricing and other strategies
to gain more market power and slow the pace of competition.
One of the obvious big differences between the two types of
license is the issuing authority. In the case of FRAND licenses, the
certifying organizations determine that certain patents are essential to the
technology and then the patent owner voluntarily commits to a FRAND
license. In the case of a compulsory license, the government determines
that the need of the public for the patent overweighs the patentee’s rights
to exploit it commercially, and then the government dictates the market
price. With the ICT patents, the SSO determines that a patent should be
licensed as an SEP just like how the government determines that a patent
is critical to public welfare. But once it is determined that the patent is
critical to public welfare, compulsory licenses become more of a
regulatory mechanism where the government interferes to make
corrections. However, with FRAND licenses, it is the owner who
determines the price and thus, the market mechanism defines the
licensing price of the patent. That said, both of these types of license
achieve the same result of directly or indirectly prevailing on the owner
to license the patent to third parties. In the case of compulsory licensing,
having the governments negotiate the value may also be perceived as
being disadvantageous to the patent owner in that the bargaining parities
may be pitted against the patent owner.
Compulsory licenses though remove the biggest debilitating
factor of the FRAND license: the royalty negotiation. The rates are preset in the case of compulsory licenses and most often, these rates are
determined after negotiation with the patent owner. The determination of
rates at the beginning of the process leads to a certain level of stability
for users of the technology. In software patent terms, once a patent is
deemed essential, having a negotiated rate will not only help the potential
licensees but also the end-users of the technology. It reduces the cost and
inefficiencies involved with litigation. Similarly, it reduces the
opportunities to engage in protracted negotiations to arrive at a royalty
range or rate, which improves the efficiency of the system by allowing
parties to come to terms more quickly. The possibility of creating patent
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hold-up becomes minimal with compulsory licenses. Hopefully, the
possibility of increased returns from the market will minimize the barrier
to innovate further over the technology and contributes to the progressive
goals of the system. Interestingly, in early 2015, the IEEE is now in the
process of revising its policies pertaining to the assessment of royalties.
That is, the standard setting body is essentially revising its policies such
that the royalty for an SEP that is used in a device will be determined
based on the SEP’s value to the component as opposed to the whole
product, which is the norm.168 Interestingly, the Justice Department has
found this to have the potential to be pro-competitive.169 This
development takes the form of FRAND licenses even closer to a hybrid
of compulsory licenses, which this paper ultimately proposes. Instead of
the government, the SSO as the standards body imposes rules that pre-set
the royalty range thereby imposing some limits but increasing the clarity
for the patent owner as well as the licensee. This is indeed closer to what
Judge Robart sought to accomplish in the decision discussed above. One
of the biggest criticisms with the FRAND licenses is that it has resulted
in SEPs becoming a tool to gain business strength between competitors
rather than a tool to innovate. For example, Google’s purchase of the
Motorola mobility’s patents is cited as a defensive acquisition. That is,
Google was accused of using Oracle’s Java in an infringing manner in its
android technology. Motorola’s patent portfolio, which Google acquired,
consisted of patents on networking and video encoding which created a
defense for Google to counter-allege that Oracle was infringing on some
of Google’s patents. When Google acquired Motorola’s patents similar
suspicions caused the Justice Department to announce an investigation to
determine the presence of any prevailing abuse of the involved SEPs.170
A compulsory license regime will largely eliminate such issues that
plague the SEPs by being more consumer friendly.
While the above narrative compared both of these forms of
licenses, this paper asserts that a more workable model would be a
hybrid of these licenses that operates to eliminate some of the
debilitating constraints of FRAND licenses. The authors are mindful that
the structure presented may be a bit simplistic.
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1. The SSOs should continue to determine what type of
patents represent a standard with respect to ICT
patents.
Once a patent becomes a standard, the patent owner
should be able to license it on FRAND terms which,
in turn, will become applicable to all licensees
involved.
2. In setting the FRAND terms, a standard royaltyrange should be negotiated with the patent owner by
the SSOs. Such negotiation should resolve questions
such as grant-back from the licensees, the patent
owner’s right to seek an injunction and the
circumstances for which such injunction can be
sought and situations where dispute settlement can
disrupt the licensee’s use of the technology. Thus,
each of the SSOs should create standard FRAND
licensing terms applicable to SEP licenses.
Operationally, standardization of the FRAND
licenses are not a new phenomenon; several
organizations
including
the
International
Telecommunication Union, the Department of
Justice, USPTO, Competition Policy International
have already attempted standardization of FRAND
licenses to reduce litigations.171 That of course, will
take it closer to compulsory licensing, where the
patentee has limited room to negotiate the terms of
the license. Interestingly, at the time of this paper
going to print, the IEEE was considering a proposal
to change its intellectual property policy to
streamline royalty determination. The new policy
states the value of the patent holder’s royalty will be
calculated from the value that the SEP adds to the
“smallest saleable compliant implementation.” Thus
the calculation of reasonable royalties will be based
on the value of the SEP over the a) value of the
171

See William New, ITU Undertakes Work on Standards Essential Patents,
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functionality of the smallest saleable compliant
implementation that uses the patent; b) in light of the
value of the contributions of other SEPs and c) value
of existing licenses, if any.172 Currently, we use the
entire sale value of the product to calculate the
royalty while this advocates a calculation based on
the smallest saleable component.173 Allowing
companies to limit the license to part of the SEP
may also reduce litigations as patent owners cannot
block the implementation of the product which can
also leave patent-licensees with alternatives. 174 A
three to six month period should be allocated for
potential licensees or interested parties to submit
reasons to SSOs as to why a particular patent should
benefit from a term that is different from the
standard term or range. A resolution with SSO
should result in the term becoming a part of the SSO
agreement with the patent holder.
3. In gist, an SEP patent should be offered by the SSO
to various licensees on the same terms and
conditions. Where a patent owner reneges on the
standard terms and conditions, the SSO should have
the ability to conduct a review of the patent as an
SEP. Where the owner acts egregiously, the SSO
should have the ability to seek patents from other
members to create compatible standards. The last
suggestion would require a complete overhaul of the
SSO system.
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CONCLUSION
It is important to have an appropriate form of license that
minimizes the technology hold-ups that are created when parties attempt
to resolve differences. From a broader perspective, access to technology
is an important element of the trade regime. In most nations, especially
poorer nations, access to technology is important to achieve the
objectives of the international trade regime outlined in Article 7 and 8 of
the TRIPS agreement.175 For instance, Article 7 of TRIPS asserts the
importance of “protection and enforcement of IP rights” to “national
social and economic welfare of members.”176 The principles under which
the objectives will be satisfied are outlined in Article 8, which recognizes
members’ rights to adopt public interest or public health measures
consistent with the TRIPS provisions.
Indeed, lack of uniform access to technology creates the digital
divide about which much has been written. Most literature on the digital
divide highlights how such a lack of access exacerbates class divisions in
countries like India and South Africa. This is because technological
devices both increase connections between people, and provide
opportunities to enhance one’s knowledge. Technologies have the ability
to create power for the marginalized in a class based-society. Where
access to such technology is limited to certain classes, it perpetuates and
reinforces the class-based system that has caused much social and
economic malaise. This is exactly what the international trade
agreements hope to prevent.
While we do not suggest that governments jump in and
compulsorily license such technology, governments need not be
bystanders while corporations use such technology as political tools to
the detriment of its electorate. In poorer nations, a hybrid of FRAND and
compulsory licenses that standardizes the royalty-ranges and other terms
of the SEP license would not only lead to more technological access, it
would also lead to more resources directed toward innovation. This
would result in a more informed electorate and a more efficient system
generally. While it is understandable that SSOs have limited authority
over a patent owner with respect to the patent, a hybrid license that
incorporates a component of standardized rates could eliminate some of
these issues that are currently plaguing the FRAND licenses.
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